Streszczenie We proposed an efficient and secure digital signature scheme using elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) and bilinear pairings in this paper. The proposed scheme employs the general cryptographic hash function (i.e., SHA-1) instead of map-to-point function, because the map-to-point is a cost-intensive operation and it is usually implemented as a probabilistic algorithm. Further, our scheme is computationally efficient as one bilinear paring and three elliptic curve scalar point multiplication operations are executed for signature generation and verification, and thus the scheme requires much lesser computation cost than other related schemes. In addition, in the random oracle model, our scheme is proven to be existential unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks (EUF-CMA) based on a variation of the collusion attack algorithm with ktraitors (k-CAA3) problem.
Introduction
The authenticity, integrity and non-repudiation of the digital documents that are transmitted over any public network, can be achieved by using the digital signature. The digital signature is nothing but the string of digital bits and is different from any hand-written signature. That is, the digital signature of a person is changed if the message varies, whereas the handwritten signature computed by a person is fixed for all documents. The signature scheme can be found useful in many applications of network security where the detection of forgery or protection of tampering of digital documents is necessary.
Literature Review
The public key cryptography (PKC) was proposed by Diffie and Hellman [1] in which two keys are used, called private key and public key. The user chooses his private key that is to be kept secret while the corresponding public key is known to all and thus, it needs to be authenticated by a trusted third party, named as a certificate authority (CA). After the pioneer work of Diffie-Hellman, many digital signature schemes have been proposed [2−5,7−11] based on either the large integer factorization problem (IFP) or the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Based on IFP and DLP, Shao [5] proposed a digital signature scheme and claimed that it is more secure than ElGamal scheme [3] with similar computation cost. However, Li and Xiao [6] presented a simple attack and proved that Shao's scheme is insecure. In the RSA scheme [2] , the signature length is same as the length of the modulus used and in the ElGamal scheme [3] , the length of the signature is twice the length of the modulus used. In order to reduce the signature length, Schnorr [7] proposed a signature scheme where the length of the signature is independent of the length of the modulus used.
To enhance the security, Harn [8] in 1994 also developed a new signature scheme based on two different cryptographic assumptions. He claimed that the security of the scheme could be compromised if both IFP and DLP assumptions are simultaneously solvable by a polynomial time-bounded algorithm. The idea of combining more than one computational problem is good from the security point of view, however, Lee and Hwang [9] proved that if one of the assumption, say DLP is solvable then Harn's scheme is completely breakable with high probabilities. Subsequently, they proposed a modified scheme based on the hardness assumptions as adopted in the Harn's scheme to defeat the problem pointed out by them. In 2000, Nyang and Song [10] , proposed an efficient digital signature scheme using a zero-knowledge based identification (ZKI) scheme and hash function. The computational performance of the scheme is better than other RSAlike schemes and other well-known signature schemes also. In 2007, Chung et al. [11] proposed another ZKI-based signature scheme using ECC, however, the scheme is not secure as demonstrated by Yang and Chang [12] .
Motivations and Contributions
Recently, ECC [13, 14] and bilinear pairing [15] have been received great attention due to the following reasons: (1) ECC needs smaller key size, lesser bandwidth, low computation cost and low storage space. (2) The efficient algorithms to compute the bilinear pairing (Weil pairing [15] or Tate pairing [16] ) are available in the literature. The computation cost for signature generation and verification of the previous schemes are very high since they employed a cost-intensive operation, called modular exponentiation. Besides, most of the previous schemes are insecure against different attacks [6, 9, 12] . In order to speed up the signature generation and verification, and to provide strong security, we proposed an efficient and secure digital signature scheme using ECC and bilinear pairings, where instead of map-to-point (MTP) function, the general cryptographic hash function (i.e., SHA-1) is used in our scheme. Because, the MTP is a cost-intensive operation and it is usually implemented as a probabilistic polynomial time-bounded algorithm. Based on a variation of the collusion attack algorithm with k traitors (k-CAA3) assumption [17, 18] , the proposed scheme is existential unforgeable in the random oracle model [19] against the adaptive chosen message and identity adversary. In addition, the computational performance of the proposed scheme is better than other schemes as shown in section 4.3.
Roadmap of the Paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary technical details required throughout the paper and in Section 3, we present our digital signature scheme. The analyses in terms security and performance of the proposed scheme are given in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 gives the concluding remarks.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduced the concepts of elliptic curve-based bilinear pairings and some hard mathematical problems.
Bilinear Pairings
Let G q be a cyclic additive group, which is generated by P, with prime order q, and G m is a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order q. Let ê:G q ×G q →G m be an admissible bilinear mapping with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: ê(aP,bQ)=ê(P,Q) ab for all P,Q∈ G q and a,b∈ R Z * q .
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P,Q∈G q such that ê(P,Q) =1 m , where 1 m is an identity element in the group G m , where P is a generator of G q and ê(P,P) is a generator of G m .
• Computability: There is an efficient polynomial time-bounded algorithm that can compute ê(P,Q) for all P,Q∈G q .
Computational Problems
Definition 1. Collision Attack Assumption 1 (k-CAA1) [17, 18] : For an integer k,
r+h P ) is impossible by a polynomial time-bounded algorithm. Definition 2. Collision Attack Assumption 2 (k-CAA2) [17, 18] : For an integer k, given {h, P, (h 1 ,
r+h P ) is impossible by a polynomial time-bounded algorithm.
Definition 3. Strong CAA (k-sCAA1) [17, 18] : [20] as if the value of h is known, then the problem k-CAA2 is not hard. Since the order of the group G q is a prime number q, so for any x ∈ Z * q satisfies x = (r + h) −1 mod q for some h and provides the possbility of the attack. To prevent this attack, the k-sCAA1 problem was proposed in [21] , which assumes that h is also unknown. However, the problem k-CAA3 is hard to break by any polynomial time-bounded algorithm even ifh is known. This is because, x = (r +ah) −1 mod q is a linear equation with two unknowns r and a and thus, the probability for finding a number x ∈ Z * q that satisfies the above equation is 
Proposed Digital Signature Scheme
In this section, the proposed efficient digital signature scheme using ECC and bilinear pairings is given. It employs the general cryptographic hash function instead of map-to-point function so that our scheme is ease-to-use and becomes computationally efficient. The proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
• Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter as input, and returns a list of system's parameter. For a given security parameter k∈Z + , this algorithm works as follows: • KeyGen: This algorithm takes the system parameter Ω as input and returns the private key of the user. 
Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In this section, the security and the performance of the proposed scheme are analyzed. As stated earlier, the proposed scheme is existential unforgeability against the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks based on the variation of Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors (k-CAA3) assumption, which is addressed now.
Correctness of the Proposed Scheme
Therefore, σ = g is satisfied and it proves the correctness of the proposed scheme.
Security Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
Theorem (Existential Unforgeability). If there exists an adaptively chosen message and identity adversary A who can breach the security of the proposed scheme in polynomial time t with success probability ε, then there exists an algorithm C that can solve the k-CAA3 problem using A with probability ε ≥ ε • Hash Queries to H: Here, we assume that the output of the H-oracle is uniformly • Sign Queries: When A submits a Sign query on (ID,m), C then replies as follows:
(a) If ID=ID * , C chooses a number h∈ R Z q and computes the signature as follows:
• Set R←(P-haP) and H(m,R)←h.
• Set V←P and output the signature (R,V).
(b) If ID=ID * , C chooses a number r∈ R Z q and computes the signature as follows:
• Compute R=rP and h=H(m, R).
• Compute V=(r+hd ID ) −1 P and then output the signature (R,V).
• Verify Queries: Upon receiving a Verify query on (R,V) with (ID,m), C then does as follows:
(a) If ID=ID * , holds, C then quits the simulation.
(b) Else, verify the signature (R,V) using the public key Q ID of ID according to the proposed Verify algorithm.
• 
Thus, the success probability of the adversary A to break the security of the proposed scheme is
Efficiency Analysis of the Proposed Scheme
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the proposed scheme, we compare different schemes [8−11] with ours in terms of the computation cost. According to [11, 22] , the Table 1 includes the various time complexities and their conversion to the time complexity for executing the modular multiplication (T M L ). The Table 2 compares the proposed scheme with other existing schemes [8−11] , and it can be noted that our scheme is computationally efficient than [8−10] . It can be seen that the proposed scheme increases the computational cost slightly with respect to the scheme [11] , however, none of the schemes [8−11] are secure as shown in [6, 9, 12] whereas our scheme is existential unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks based on k-CAA3 assumption in the random oracle model. Hence, our scheme in all respect is more efficient than other schemes. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, an efficient and provably-secure digital signature scheme, which is based on ECC and bilinear pairings and without using map-to-point function, is designed. We proved that our scheme is existential unforgeable against the adaptive chosen message and identity attacks based on the variation of Collusion Attack Algorithm with k traitors (k-CAA3) assumption in the random oracle model. The comparative study signifies that the proposed scheme has low computation cost than almost all previous schemes (except one), however, all are not well secured. Thus, our scheme is efficient and can be applied in real applications.
